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Abstract 
Purpose: What does mentalese refer to as a theory introduced in the science of language is the 
main concern of this paper.  
Method: The study is mainly descriptive where previous and related studies are reviewed and 
presented to reach a view about mentalese as an introduced theory in the science of language.   
Results: It has been argued for a long time whether we think in language or do we use language to 
think. Having known two or more languages, do you we think separately in each language? Does 
each language possesses a different place in our brains?  
Conclusions: There seems to be an agreement about the availability of mentalese as a linguistic 
faculty but there are different views about the nature and the interpretation of this faculty in relation 
to thought.  
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Mentalese 
Both language and thinking faculties are two gifts 
given to man is undeniable fact. Yet, do these two 
faculties interrelate to each other? Or do they affect one 
another?  Do we think in language or do we use 
language in thinking? In fact, there are many questions 
that seem sometimes if not usually unanswerable. Had 
some of them has been answered, it is only answered 
theoretically but have never been proved scientifically. 
Or, has it been answered scientifically, it lacks the 
adequate evidences for such claims. It is a truth, 
however, that discussing language in relation to mind is 
only discussing abstract by abstract. Strictly speaking, 
there are many theories (hypotheses) where in some 
attempts have been made to answer the above raised 
questions from among these theories is one called as the 
language of thought, or more recently as mentalese. In 
technical terms, it is usually referred to as computer-
based theory of language and thought (see Antony, n.d.; 
Bermudez, 2003; Machery, 2004, Pinker, 2002; Slezak, 
2009). 
Principally, the mentalese theory or hypothesis 
is originated by Chomsky (1968), Fodor (1975) and 
Pinker (1994), Lera Boroditsky (2001). Typically and 
for one reason or another it was a reaction to both the 
Whorf-Sapir theory (hypothesis) and Ordinary 
Language Theory (hypothesis), (see Wiley 2006). In 
its simplest words, Whorf- Sapir hypothesis 
maintains that we think in words, or our thoughts are 
reflected by our words and vice versa. Additionally, 
it is assumed that a speaker of English language, for 
example, is different from a speaker of Arabic 
language is a sense that thinking in Arabic is entirely 
different from thinking in English and this applies to 
all other languages according to Edward Sapir and 
Benjamin Lee Whorf (Whorf- Sapir), Schlenker 
(2006).  Regarding the core idea or claim of the 
Ordinary Language hypothesis, it is stated by Wiley 
(ibid: p. 1) as: 
People often talk silently to themselves, 
engaging in what is called inner speech, internal 
conversation, inner dialogue, self-talk and so on. This 
seems to be an inherent characteristic of human 
beings, commented on as early as Plato, who 
regarded thought as inner speech.   
Unlike the Whorf-Sapir and the Ordinary 
Language hypotheses, the mentalese hypothesis 
argues in favor of that we think without words, yet all 
humans nearly share the same mechanism(s) and 
vehicles of language. That is, whether was it a French 
speaker or an English speaker, they share the same 
ideas and thoughts but they only differ in the form of 
producing those thoughts, the former will use French 
language (his/her native tongue language) and the 
other will use English as his or her native tongue 
language. 
Basically, Mentalese is “our thoughts before 
they become language, and this stuff is the same for 
human beings”, (Boroditsky, 2001: p. 1). Wiley (ibid: 
p. 1) adds: 
This approach, which sometimes uses the 
computer as a metaphor for the mind, resembles the 
Scholastic’s theory in envisioning a purely abstract 
language of thought. Whatever processes of ordinary 
language might accompany it are viewed as 
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epiphenomenal, gloss or what might be called “fluff.” 
Ordinary language, according to this view, is a pale 
shadow of the actual language of thought. In addition 
mentalese is regarded as both innate and 
unconscious. It is a faculty that is claimed to be 
present at birth and one which operates below the 
awareness of the mind.   
 
In his book, Pinker (1995: 81) maintains: 
 
We end up with the following picture. People do 
not think in English or Chinese or Apache; they think 
in a language of thought. This language of thought 
probably looks a bit like all these languages; 
presumably it has symbols for concepts, and 
arrangements of symbols that correspond to who did 
what to whom, as in the paint-spraying representation 
shown above. But compared with any given 
language, mentalese must be richer in some ways and 
simpler in others. It must be richer, for example, in 
that several concept symbols must correspond to a 
given English word like stool or stud.       
 
One can notice it is exactly the opposite of what 
both Sapir and Whorf believe as “People's thoughts 
are determined by the categories systems of 
classification made available by their language”, 
(Schlenker, ibid: 1). In spite of this, Pinker (1994: 82) 
insists in his book and he claims:  
 
Knowing a language, then, is knowing how to 
translate mentalese into strings of words and vice versa. 
People without a language would still have mentalese, 
and babies and many non-human animals presumably 
have simpler dialects. Indeed, if babies did not have a 
mentalese to translate to and from English, it is not clear 
how learning English could take place, or even what 
learning English would mean. 
 
Thought all these theories are still alive but each 
one is criticized by the other one or instead another 
new one. For example, the mentalese hypothesis is 
criticized for being unconscious. That is, being 
unconscious means there is no adequate evidence for 
empirical data to prove the accuracy of such claims, 
(Wiley: ibid).  
Another claim against this theory is that  
conducted by Clark (2002) who attempted to prove 
Dennett’s ideas of numeral cognition as an alternative 
for the mentalese theory.  
Conclusion  
For all intents and purposes, an abstract thing 
introduced by an abstract thing will produce a more 
abstract thing. That is, the input (human’s brain and 
language) are abstract, the given (the hypothesis of 
mentalese along with other theories) are also abstract, 
and no doubt the outputs are abstract. The researcher 
believes that all of these theories have provided or 
come out with something true about language and 
thought. It is seemingly impossible to present such a 
topic as language and thought from the point of view 
of only one science or field of study. That is to say, 
we need to form an approach or field of science that 
mix all: language study, philosophy, psychology, 
sociology, neurology, and some other sciences.  
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